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Protecting the "Marketplace of Ideas":
The First Amendment and
Public School Teachers' Classroom Speech
Emily Holmes Davis*
INTRODUCTION
At Lakeland Community College near Cleveland, Ohio, a
philosophy professor was punished for making statements about the
development of his personal philosophy in his class lectures and on
his class syllabi.' The controversy began in March 2003, when a
student complained that Dr. Tuttle mentioned his personal
philosophical beliefs too often in class. As a result of the
complaint, the college told Dr. Tuttle that he may no longer discuss
his own philosophical beliefs in his discussion-based philosophy
class. This free speech dispute at Lakeland is just one example
from the swelling tempest of similar disruptions recently occurringS4
in public schools.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2006.
1. Jamilah Evelyn, Saving He Was Punished for Revealing His Faith in
Class. Adjunct Sues Ohio College, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 16. 2004, at
A13.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Jennifer Gonzalez, Religion in Class Sparks Conflict;
Lakeland Pro" Claims lie Was Punished. PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Feb. 6, 2004. at B3.
4. For example, George Washington University will respond to any and
all allegations of faculty "misconduct" if the complaints are made by calling
the Compliance Line. A complaint may be made by someone who is not
formally associated with the University. A complaint will trigger a formal
investigation by the administration of the subject of the complaint. The
administration will respond to all allegations of misconduct including
"rudeness." See John Banzhaf, Rudeness Police, G.W. HATCHET (Wash.,
D.C.), Sept. 21, 2004, available at
http://www.gwhatchet.com/news/2004/09/2 1 /Opinions/Columnn.Rudeness.Polic
e-723696.shtml. On the first day of her American Government class at
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The classroom is a unique "marketplace of ideas"' where
future leaders learn through a vigorous exchange of different
arguments and theories. Society has an interest in exposing students
Metropolitan State College of Denver, a professor told her students that
education is dominated by liberal professors because conservative thinkers do
not know how to think critically, and she suggested that conservative thinkers
drop her class. As a result, a student filed a complaint and this professor began
to receive death threats. See Steven K. Paulson, Academic Rights Roil
Colorado Campuses; Rules to Protect Conservative Students Led to Threats,
Some Professors Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at A13. A sociology
professor at Colorado State University made critical statements to his class
about the United States military invasion of Iraq and one of his students, a
former soldier and wife of a soldier who was in Iraq at the time, expressed her
support for the troops- in response, the professor told her to drop the class.
See David Harsanyi, Ideologue's Class Lacked Education, DENVER Posr, Aug.
12, 2004, at B. At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, an
English professor sent an e-mail to her entire class criticizing one student's
views which he had expressed in class. See Jane Stancill, Teacher 'Sorry' For
Singling Out UNC Student, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 20, 2004,
at Al. Instructor Elizabeth Ito expressed her own thoughts about the United
States military invasion of Iraq during her business-writing class at Forsyth
Technical Community College and invited her students to share their opinions
about the war; ito was fired for insubordination when she refused to promise
she would never discuss the war again in her classroom. See Michelle Johnson,
Instructor Dismissed by Forsyth Tech Appeals Decision, Her Vocal Opposition
to the Iraq War is Reason College Won't Renew Her Contract, Teacher Says,
WINStON-SALEM J., Sept. 5, 2003, at B1. Harvard Law has considered a ban
on offensive speech, and as a result some law professors are afraid to talk
about any controversial issues in class. See Harvard Law School Weighs Free-
Speech Restrictions, PROVIDENCE J.. Nov. 22, 2002, at A9. After calling the
United States a "terrorist nation," a professor at the University of Texas
became the subject of a letter-writing campaign calling for his termination,
and students at the University of New Mexico rallied against a professor who
told his class. "Anyone who would blow up the Pentagon would have my
vote." See Gregg Easterbrook, Free Speech Doesn't Come Without Cost: The
First Amendment Isn't a Shield Against Criticism, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at
A20.
5. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United
States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) ("The classroom
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind
of authoritative selection.'"); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603 (1967)).
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to this "robust exchange of ideas"" in order to train future leaders
and members of a democracy to be critical and analytical thinkers.
In order to promote society's interest, educators concentrate on
creating a classroom environment that sustains a robust forum for
debate and allows students to develop the ability to disseminate
information and think critically." Simultaneously, states, through
6. Keyishian. 385 U.S. at 603. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511
(recognizing that students benefit from the expression of diverse viewpoints in
education): Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961
SuP. CT. REV. 245, 257 (1961) ("Public discussions of public issues, together
with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on those issues, must
have a freedom unabridged by our agents.").
7. See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1987) (quoting
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)) (acknowledging that public
schools are vitally important "in the preparation of individuals for
participation as citizens"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 J.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The
importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation
as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests,
long has been recognized by our decisions."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 637 (1943) ("That [schools] are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes."); Gregory A. Clarick, Public School Teachers and the First
Amendment Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 728-29
(1990); Meiklejohn, supra note 6, at 255 ("Self-government can exist only
insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity. sensitivity, and
generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is
assumed to express."); Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the Classroom:
Teaching the Limits of the First Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597. 652-57
(1999).
8. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 ("The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.") (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)); see
also Meiklejohn, supra note 6 at 257 ("Education ... is the attempt to so
inform and cultivate the mind and will of a citizen that he shall have the
wisdom, the independence, and, therefore, the dignity of a governing citizen.
Freedom of education is, thus ... a basic postulate in planning of a free
society."). There is also an argument that academic freedom is an individual
constitutional right, and restrictions on teachers' classroom speech are
unconstitutional. See generally Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603 ("Our Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent
value to all of us .... That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
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the public schools, have an interest in promoting community values,
which they accomplish through control over public school
curricula." Therefore, the more discretion a school has in restricting
teacher in-class speech, the more control the state maintains over
the curriculum and value inculcation. However, when courts place
fewer restrictions on teachers' classroom speech, teachers are better
able to create a robust learning environment for their students."
the classroom."); AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE WrrH 1970 INTERPRETIVE
COMMENTS, at http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm (last
modified Apr. 2004) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review)
("Academic freedom is essential to [the free search for truth and its free
exposition] .... Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for
the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to
freedom in learning.").
9. See generally Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (stating that school boards have the
power to set school curriculum in a way that promotes community values and
teaches those values to students).
10. See generall@ Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Barneite, 319 U.S. at 642
(stating that school officials may not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion"). But see Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97. 109 (1968) (holding that a requirement that schools
teach creationism violates the First Amendment's prohibition of establishment
of religion). At least one member of the Court hesitated to recognize First
Amendment rights of teachers when facilitating the curriculum:
I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach
school children takes with him into the classroom a
constitutional right to teach sociological, economic,
political, or religious subjects that the school's
managers do not want discussed. This Court has said
that the rights of free speech "while fundamental in
our democratic society. still do not mean that everyone
with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group
at any public place and at any time."
Id. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536.
554 (1965)). Some commentators also reject the idea that teachers should
enjoy the same free speech rights in the classroom that they do as citizens. See
William Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Pro['essors,
1970 DUKE. L.J. 841, 856 (1970). Van Alstyne argues:
[T]he use [by a teacher or professor] of his
classroom ... deliberately to proselytize for a personal
cause or knowingly to emphasize only that selection of
data best conforming to his own personal biases is far
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The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the degree of
First Amendment protection awarded in-class speech of teachers
generally." However, the Court has addressed the free speech
rights of government employees and of public high school
students.13 Without specific Supreme Court precedent to follow
regarding a teacher's in-class speech, lower courts have used these
two analogous lines of precedent to determine the level of First
beyond the license granted by the freedom of speech
and furnishes precisely the just occasion to question his
fitness to teach.
Id. at 856.
11. See generally Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom
Speech and the irst Amendment. 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 6-7 (2001) (stating that
"[ijn the absence of a Supreme Court decision clarifying teachers' rights, in-
class speech is chilled and the balance of interests between school boards and
teachers is impermissibly titled in favor of the former"); Weiner. supra note 7
at 624 (citing Donna Propkop. Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a
Balance Between First Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV., 2533, 2538 (1993)).
12. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (explaining
that a government employer can restrict employee speech based on an actual
or potential disruption in workplace efficiency even when the speech at issue
addresses a matter of public concern and in order to restrict speech based on a
potential disruption, the employer's prediction of a potential disruption must
be "reasonable"): Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138. 146 (1983) (holding that, to
determine if the speech at issue addresses a matter of public concern, the court
must examine the content, form, and context of the speech in question);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that, to determine
the First Amendment protection of public employee speech, the court must
"arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a
citizen. in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State. as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees").
13. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260. 273 (1988)
(holding that a high school may restrict "student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns"); 'linker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that high
school student speech that "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others" is not protected by the
First Amendment). The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the First
Amendment protection afforded to postsecondary school student speech, so
lower courts have applied the existing high school student speech precedents
to student speech at the university level. See infra Section 1 (B) (2).
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Amendment protection such speech should receive. 4
This Note examines whether the public employee and
student speech standards are sufficient to determine the level of
First Amendment protection that should be afforded high school
and university teachers' in-class speech. This Note concludes that
the public employee and student speech precedents are inadequate.
In Part 1, this Note describes the public employee and student free
speech Supreme Court precedents. Part II examines five circuit
court cases that determined the First Amendment protection of
public teacher in-class speech, thereby demonstrating the confusion
experienced by lower courts attempting to settle this issue. In Part
III, this Note analyzes the methods lower courts have used in
applying the existing precedent to teachers' classroom speech and
addresses the inconsistency and confusion among lower courts in
this area of the law. Part III further concludes that the public
14. Several cases apply the public employee precedent to determine the
level of First Amendment protection of teacher in-class speech. See, e.g.,
Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that speech about the environmental benefits of industrial hemp was
a matter of public concern); Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding that college professor's use of "nigger" and "bitch" in
connection with academic discussion of those terms during discussion on social
deconstructivism, involved a matter of public concern); Kirkland v. Northside
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Pickering-
Connick to determine that a teacher's supplemental reading list was not a
matter of public concern); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a college professor's use of profanity in the classroom was not
speech addressing a matter of public concern): Loeffelman v. Bd. of Educ., 134
S.W.3d 637. 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a teacher's comments
about biracial children were not a matter of public concern). There are
several cases that apply the public school student speech precedent to
determine the First Amendment protection of teacher in-class speech. See,
e.g., Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773. 776-78 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a classroom was a nonpublic forum, the teacher speech was school-
sponsored, so a school could restrict teacher speech if reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical concern); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a university's restrictions on a physical education
professor's statements about his own understanding of the force behind
human nature did not infringe the professor's free speech rights): Nicholson v.
Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858. 865-66 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a teacher who
was also the school newspaper's advisor did not engage in protected speech
when he encouraged students to publish controversial articles in the paper).
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employee and student free speech precedents are inadequate tests
for teacher in-class speech, at both the secondary and
postsecondary levels, because these precedents fail to consider
many important factors unique to the education process.
The doctrinal uncertainty and the inadequacy of the existing
precedent demand that courts use a different approach when
analyzing the First Amendment protection of teachers' classroom
speech, and Part IV of this Note proposes an alternative test for
public school teacher in-class speech. Courts have recently applied
the same tests to high school and college student speech"' and have
applied the same standards to secondary and postsecondary teacher
classroom speech;' therefore, the proposed test also applies to
teachers at both education levels. The new test eliminates the
"public concern" threshold test and instead considers whether the
15. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir.
2004) (applying the Hazelwood standard to a university student's curricular
speech); Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 947-49 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying a
standard similar to Tinker to a student school newspaper at Governors State
University), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 01 -4155 (7th Cir. June
25. 2003); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the
Hazelwood standard to a graduate student's curricular speech). See also infra
Section I (B) (2).
16. Courts have applied the Pickering-Connick standard to teachers' in-
class speech at the secondary and postsecondary levels. See, e.g., Cockrel v.
Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying the
Pickering-Connick standard to a fifth-grade teacher's classroom speech);
Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll.. 260 F.3d 671, 678 (6th Cir, 2001) (applying the
Pickering-Connick standard to a college instructor's classroom speech): Blum
v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005. 1012 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the Pickering-Connick
standard to determine that a law professor's in-class speech promoting the
legalization of marijuana was a matter of public concern). Courts have also
applied the Hazelwood standard to teachers' in-class speech at the secondary
and postsecondary levels. See, e.g., Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist.,
208 F.3d at 908, 914-15 (10th Cir. 2000). In Vanderhurst, the court applied
Hazelwood to professor in-class speech without actually holding that
Hazelwood is the proper analytical framework. The court did not need to
decide this issue because the holding of the case relies on the fact that the
appellant did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. Id.
However, the court's Haze/wood analysis is illustrative of how a court would
apply Hazelwood to a professor's classroom speech. See also Miles, 944 F.2d
at 777 (holding the Jfazelwood standard applicable to a high school teacher's
in-class speech).
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teacher's classroom speech caused an actual or potential substantial
disruption in the facilitation of the curriculum. If this threshold
requirement is met, courts should then balance a number of
interests, including an educator's interest in teaching the specified
curriculum free from excessive speech restrictions and the school's
interest in effectively promoting societal values through a particular
curriculum. Such a test will provide courts with an adequate tool to
analyze the unique category of teacher classroom speech while still
providing schools with the authority to implement a particularized
curriculum that reflects community values.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A. Free Speech Rights of Public Employees
1. Pickering v. Board of Education
Pickering v. Board of Education" constitutes a significant
case in which the Supreme Court defined public employee speech
rights. Marvin Pickering, a public high school teacher, wrote and
submitted a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school board's
misallocation of school funds." The school board fired Pickering in
response to the publication of his critical letter. To determine the
First Amendment protection afforded to a public employee's
speech, the Court used a balancing test, weighing the "interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." '"
The Court found Pickering's criticisms of the school board
to be a "matter of public concern" because school funding was a
17. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
18. Jd. at 568.
19. [d. at 564.
20. Jd. at 566.
21. Jd. at 568.
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topic of public debate." In addition, the Court held that Pickering's
interest in speaking as a citizen about the school board's allocation
of funds outweighed the school board's interest in workplace
efficiency- therefore, Pickering's speech was protected.' 3 Although
Pickering involved a teacher's speech, his speech occurred outside
the classroom. The Court found he was speaking as a citizen on a
matter of public concern rather than as an employee. Thus,
Pickering did not directly address the protection of teachers'
classroom speech.
2. Connick v. Myers
In Connick v. Myers,4 another landmark public employee
speech decision, the Court expanded upon the Pickering "public
concern" test.25 In Connick, Shelia Myers, an assistant district
attorney, faced transfer to a different section of the criminal court. 
?
Opposing the impending transfer, Myers distributed a
questionnaire to her office co-workers in order to ascertain their
views on certain issues.! The questionnaire covered issues like the
"office transfer policy" and "whether employees felt pressured to
work in political campaigns."' Myers was fired after distributing
22. Id. at 571-72. The Court observed: -[T]he question whether a school
system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern...
On such a question free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making
by the electorate." Id.
23. Id. at 572-73. The Court concluded that Pickering's statements did
not hinder his work performance in the classroom or interfere with the
school's daily operation, so "the interest of the school administration in
limiting the teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is not
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public." Id.
24. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
25. Id. at 146 (holding that, to determine whether the employee speech in
question addresses a matter of public concern, the court must examine the
content, form, and context of the speech).
26. Id. at 140.
27. Id. at 141.
28. Id. (noting the questionnaire covered "office transfer policy, office
morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political
the questionnaire. Augmenting the importance of the "public
concern" doctrine, the Court held that, in order to apply the
Pickering balancing test, the Court must first find as a threshold
matter that the employee's speech was a "matter of public
concern." In order to determine if the speech addresses a "matter
of public concern," the Court must analyze "the content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.""
The Court determined that one of the questions from the survey,32
was a matter of public concern, but the speech was unprotected
because Myers's interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of
public concern did not outweigh her employer's interest in
workplace efficiency."'
3. Waters v. Churchill
In a recent decision, Waters v. Churchill,34 the Court
emphasized the importance of a government employer's interest in
workplace efficiency. In Waters, a hospital fired a nurse after she
criticized one of her superiors during a conversation with a co-
worker. The Court held that the government employer's interest
in workplace efficiency is so substantial that an employer could
campaigns").
29. Id.
30. Id. at 146. The Court stated: "tl]f Myers' questionnaire cannot be
fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge." Id.
31. Id. at 147-48.
32. [d. at 149. The Court held that the question, "[E]ver feel pressured
to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates[?],"
addressed a matter of public concern because the Court had recently held that
"official pressure upon employees to work for political candidates not of the
worker's own choice constitutes a coercion of belief in violation of
fundamental constitutional rights." Id. (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507.
515-16 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
33. Connick, 461 US. at 154.
34. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
35. Id. at 673 (noting that Court precedent "giv[es] substantial weight to
government employers' reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the
speech involved is a matter of public concern").
36. [d. at 664-65.
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restrict speech based on an actual or potential disruption in
workplace efficiency, even when the speech at issue addresses a17
matter of public concern. To restrict speech based on a potential
disruption, the employer's prediction of a potential disruption must
be "reasonable. Thus, the Waters holding substantiated a
government employee's interest in workplace efficiency by
permitting speech restrictions based on "reasonable" predictions of
potential disruptions. '
In summary, when courts apply the Pickering-Connick
standard to free speech challenges by public employees against
their employers, they must first determine as a threshold matter if
the speech in question is a matter of public concern, and the
employee has the burden of showing that the speech addresses a
matter of public concern."" Whether the speech in question
addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law
determined by the "content, form, and context of a given statement,
as revealed by the whole record."4 If the speech does not address a
matter of public concern, the speech is not "totally beyond the
protection not the First Amendment," but "absent the most
unusual circumstances," federal courts are not the proper forums to
review a public employee's discharge for that speech. Thus, if the
court determines the speech is merely a personal work grievance,
the court is not required to balance the competing interests, and the
employer's sanction for the speech will not be scrutinized under the
First Amendment.
4
If the employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern, the employer bears the burden of showing that its interest
in workplace harmony and efficiency outweighs the employee's
interest in commenting on matters of public concern.44  If the
employer meets its burden, the employee's speech is unprotected.
37. Id. at 673.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
41. [d. at 147-48.
42. Jd. at 147.
43. Jd.
44. Jd. at 150; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 J.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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However, if the court finds that the employee's interest in speaking
on a matter of public concern outweighs the government
employer's interest in workplace efficiency, the employee's speech
is protected.4
B. Free Speech Rights of Public School Students
1. Secondary School Students
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,46 a seminal decision regarding students' speech rights, the
Supreme Court held that a high school could not punish its students
for wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam
War.4  According to the Court, in order for a school to restrict
student speech, the school must show that the restriction "was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint., 4' The Court held that the student speech
restriction is unconstitutional unless there is evidence that such a
restriction on speech is "necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline 4 1 or that the school had
"reason to anticipate that [the student speech] would substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students."5' Because this student speech was not a material or
substantial interference, the Court deemed the school's prohibition
unconstitutional.
45. Connick, 461 US. at 150.
46. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47. Id. at 513-14.
48. Id. at 509.
49. Id. at510-11.
50. Id. at 509.
51. Id. at 514.
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhireier
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlreier, 2 the Court
refined its test for determining the constitutionality of a school's
restriction on student speech . At Hazelwood East High School,
the principal deleted two articles from an issue of the student
newspaper, one about teen pregnancy and the other about
divorce) The United States Supreme Court held that the student
newspaper was not a public forum" and was part of the school
curriculum, so the newspaper constituted school-sponsored
speech. The Court stated that school-sponsored speech was
speech that "students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." '57 The
52. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
53. Id. at 273.
54. Id. at 263. 'The principal worried that the teen pregnancy article was
inappropriate for younger readers and that the pregnant students' identities
would be discovered. He was also concerned that the article about the effects
of divorce on Hazelwood students was inappropriate because a father named
in the article did not have a chance to respond to his daughter's comments or
to consent to the article's publication. Id.
55. Id. at 267. The Court stated:
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes
of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums
that... "have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions." ... If the facilities have
instead been reserved for other intended purposes,
"communicative or otherwise." then no public forum
has been created, and school officials may impose
reasonable restrictions on the speech of students.
teachers, and other members of the school community.
Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37. 46 n.7 (1983)
(citations omitted). See generally William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and
Freedom of Speech: Communicating the Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE &
Jt ST., 213, 250-55 (1999) (discussing the public forum analysis and explaining
the differences between the traditional public forum, designated public forum,
and the nonpublic forum).
56. Hfazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
57. [d. The Court explained these activities are part of a school's
curriculum "whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so
Court held that school officials could restrict student speech in
school-sponsored activities, so long as the restrictions were
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.",51 In
addition, the Court stated that courts should give substantial
deference to the school's legitimate pedagogical concerns.59
In summation, Tinker governs high school student speech
that is not school-sponsored. Under Tinker, a secondary school
may restrict extracurricular student speech when the speech
materially or substantially interferes with classroom procedures or
when the school can reasonably predict such disruption. In
contrast, Hazelwood governs student school-sponsored speech,
which is any expressive activity that "students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school.""3 If the student speech at issue occurs in
a nonpublic forum, is school-sponsored speech, and involves a
legitimate pedagogical interest, the school may impose restrictions
on the speech so long as the restrictions are reasonably related to
the legitimate pedagogical concern.62
2. Postsecondary School Students
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on
the free speech rights of postsecondary school students, the Court
has noted that "the precedents of this Court leave no room for the
view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First
long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences." Jd.
58. Id. at 273.
59. [d. at 271. The Court's stated legitimate pedagogical concerns
included "that [students] learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to
teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the view of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school." Id.
60. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 513
(1969). Cf. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (holding that when
determining free speech rights of public employees, the Court must give
"substantial weight to government employers' reasonable predictions of
disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public concern").
61. Htazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
62. Jd. at 273.
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Amendment protections should apply with less force on college
campuses than in the community at large."6 Still, in Hazelwood, the
Court explicitly withheld decision regarding the applicability of the
deferential Hazelwood standard to student curricular speech at the
university level.( Without specific legal precedent to follow, lower
courts have applied Hazelwood and Tinker, or similar standards, to
college student speech .
Brown v. Li
In Brown v. Li, ' a thesis committee at the University of
California at Santa Barbara refused to approve Brown's graduate
thesis and grant his master's degree after he inserted an extra
section criticizing the administration without the committee's
knowledge or consent." A divided Ninth Circuit panel upheld the
committee's decision to deny approval of Brown's thesis; however,
each judge authored a separate opinion. Judge Graber's opinion,
63. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
64. Htazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 ("We need not now decide whether
the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored
expressive activities at the college and university level.").
65. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004)
(applying the Haze/wood standard to a university student's curricular speech):
Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 947-49 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying a standard
similar to Tinker to a student school newspaper), reh'g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, No. 01-4155 (7th Cir. June 25, 2003); see also Brown v. Li, 308
F.3d 939, 951 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Hazelwood standard to a graduate
student's curricular speech).
66. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
67. Id. at 943.
That section, entitled "Disacknowledgements," began:
"I would like to offer special Fuck You's to the
following degenerates for of [sic] being an ever-present
hindrance during my graduate career[.]" It then
identified the Dean and staff of the [University of
California at Santa Barbara] graduate school, the
managers of Davidson Library, former California
Governor Wilson, [and] the Regents of the University
of California ....
Id.
68. Judge Graber extended the Haze/wood standard to govern a
350 FIRSTAMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
the opinion most relevant for purposes of this article, extended the
Hazelwood standard to a graduate student's curricular speech"' and
held that the committee's decision not to approve Brown's thesis
"was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical objective:
teaching [Brown] the proper format for a scientific paper.
7
0




In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied the Hazelwood standard to university student
curricular speech that occurs in the classroom. 71 In Axson-Flynn, an
acting student at the University of Utah claimed that her acting
professor violated her First Amendment right to refrain from
speaking by insisting that she perform scripts as written, without
omitting or replacing words the student found offensive. 4  The
graduate student's curricular speech. Id. at 951. Judge Ferguson argued
Brown's speech was unprotected because Brown tried to publish his thesis in a
deceptive manner, by inserting unauthorized material which amounted to
cheating, so the First Amendment was not even triggered. Id. at 955-56. In his
dissent, Judge Reinhardt argued that Hazelwood was not the correct standard
to apply to graduate student speech because of the differences in maturity
levels between high school and college students. Id. at 961-62 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
69. d. at 951. Although Judge Graber applied Hazelwood to a graduate
student's curricular speech, she also noted that other courts have held that
"Hazelwood deference does not apply" to extracurricular student speech at
the college level. Id at 949.
70. Jd. at 952.
71. Jd.
72. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
73. Jd. at 1289.
74. Id. at 1283. The First Amendment also prohibits being forced to
speak. "[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that
one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say."' Id. at 1284 n.4
(quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 573 (1995)). Christina Axson-Flynn, a student in the University of U-tah's
Actor 'training Program, refused to say the words "goddamn" and "fucking"
during a class exercise. She offered to omit or substitute those words or to
perform a different scene, but her acting instructor denied her requests and
threatened Axson-Flynn with a grade of zero if she did not perform the scene
as scripted. Id. at 1282.
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Tenth Circuit held that Hazelwood would apply even at the
university level, but it remanded the case to determine whether the
professor's justification for the strict adherence to the script as
written was truly a pedagogical concern.75
Hosty v. Carter
In contrast, in Hosty v. Carter,6 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the deferential Hazelwood standard was not the
appropriate standard to apply when determining the First
Amendment protection afforded to student speech at the college
level. In Hosty, a dean at Governors State University told the
publisher of the school newspaper that, prior to printing, the school
had to review the paper's content." The undivided panel did not
apply the Hazelwood standard in this case because "Hazelwood's
rationale for limiting the First Amendment rights of high school
journalism students is not a good fit for students at colleges or
universities. ',7' To determine the First Amendment protection
afforded to a student-run and student-edited school newspaper, the
Seventh Circuit applied a standard similar to Tinker: "school
administrators can only censor student media if they show that the
speech in question is legally unprotected or if they can demonstrate
that some significant and imminent physical disruption of the
campus will result from the publication's content."' This standard
is less deferential to school administration and more protective of
75. [d. at 1293 (questioning whether or not the strict script adherence
was truly a pedagogical concern or whether it was a pretext for religious
discrimination because the student was Mormon).
76. 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003), reh'g en baic granted, opinion vacated,
No. 01-4155 (7th Cir. June 25, 2003). Although the Seventh Circuit did rehear
the case, that opinion was not yet available at the time this article was
published.
77. Id. at 949. The court stated that the Hazelwood deference the
"Supreme Court found necessary in the high school setting -and in the factual
context of Hazelwood-is inappropriate for a university setting." Id.
78. Id. at 946-47. However, the newspaper's policy was that student staff
members would "determine content and format of their respective
publications without censorship or advance approval." Id.
79. [d. at 948.
80. [d. at 947.
student speech. Although the full Seventh Circuit Court vacated
Hosty in 2003, the panel decision still stands as a persuasive
example of how lower courts continue to apply high school student
speech standards to college student speech."
In conclusion, some lower courts have distinguished
between curricular and extracurricular student speech at the
university level and have applied the more deferential Hazelwood
standard to curricular student speech. s2 Conversely, another court
refused to draw that distinction at the college level and applied a
standard similar to Tinker to a student-run school newspaper.'3
Regardless of whether a court draws this curricular-extracurricular
distinction at the university level, the Brown, Axson-Flynn, and
Hosty opinions illustrate that courts are applying the same or
similar standards to student speech at the high school and college
levels.
II. CONFUSION AND INCONSISTENCY IN THE CIRCUITS
Numerous circuit court decisions illustrate the confusion
and inconsistency in the lower courts regarding the level of First
Amendment protection of teachers' classroom speech.14  These
cases demonstrate two major uncertainties present in the lower
courts' opinions. First, while some courts apply Pickering-Connick,
others apply the Hazelwood precedent to teacher in-class speech, 5
thereby creating unpredictability in determining which precedent
courts will follow." Second, some courts actually combine the
precedents and apply the Pickering-Connick "matter of public
81. On June 25. 2003, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc. vacated the
three-judge panel's April 2003 decision and granted a rehearing en banc.
82. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004);
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951 (9th Cir. 2002).
83. See Hosty, 325 F.3d at 947.
84. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052 (6th Cir.
2001); Hardy v. Jefferson Cmtv. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001);
Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll., 208 F.3d 908, 914-15 (10th Cir. 2000);
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364. 368-71 (4th Cir.
1998); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773,776-78 (10th Cir. 1991).
85. See supra note 14.
86. See Daly, supra note 11, at 2.
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concern" and the Hazelwood "legitimate pedagogical concerns"
tests to determine the protection of classroom speech, creating
even more uncertainty as to which methods a court will use when
applying precedent."8 In this second situation, for example, when
applying the "public concern" test, one court may focus solely on
the content of the speech,"8 while another considers only the
speaker's role when speaking)8°
A. Cockrel v. Shelby County School District
In Cockrel v. Shelby County School District,9 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Pickering-Connick standard
to analyze the First Amendment protection of a fifth-grade
teacher's in-class speech." Donna Cockrel, an elementary school
teacher, arranged for actor Woody Harrelson to speak to her class
on two separate occasions about the environmental benefits of
industrial hemp.'-, The school principal gave Cockrel permission to
invite Harrelson on both occasions. Subsequently, Cockrel
.. 94
received poor evaluations and was fired.
The Sixth Circuit held that Cockrel's invitation to certain
guests to speak to her class constituted "speech" under the First
87. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-71.
88. See Daly. supra note 11, at 2.
89. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1050-51.
90. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368: Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist.,
890 F.2d 794. 800 (5th Cir. 1989).
91. 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001).
92. Id. at 1050-55.
93. ld. at 1042-44. There are two types of hemp plants:
One is the marijuana plant itself, with approximately
four to seven percent of its weight comprised of
tetrahydrocannabinol ('THC'), the active chemical in
the malijuana drug: the other is industrial hemp, a
plant which grows in stalks and from which fibers can
be taken to make various goods such as paper and
clothes.
Id. at 1042 (citing John Mintz, Splendor in the Grass?, WASH. POST, Jan. 5,
1997, at HI).
94. [d. at 1045.
Amendment," so the court applied the Pickering-Connick public
concern test." The court held that the public concern
determination is "not [a question of] whether a person is speaking
in his role as an employee or a citizen, but whether the employee's
speech in fact touches on matters of public concern."" According
to this interpretation of the public concern test, speech is protected
- regardless of the speaker's role when speaking - if the content of
the speech in question relates to a matter of public concern. , The
court found that the content of Cockrel's speech, the environmental
benefits of industrial hemp, touched on a matter of public concern."
Even though Cockrel had spoken in her role as a teacher, the
content of her speech met the threshold "public concern" test.""'
Because the speech addressed a matter of public concern, the court
applied the Pickering-Connick balancing test and held that the
school's interest in workplace efficiency did not outweigh Cockrel's
interest in speaking about industrial hemp.""' Thus, her speech was
constitutionally protected.L°2
B. Hardy v. Jefferson Community College
In Hardy v. Jefferson Community College,'3 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Pickering-Connick standard
to analyze the First Amendment protection of a college instructor's
classroom speech."4  In Hardy, Kenneth Hardy, an adjunct
instructor at Jefferson Community College, taught Introduction to
Interpersonal Communication."" During the 1998 summer session,
he presented his standard lecture on "language and social
constructivism," during which students study how society uses
95. Jd. at 1049.
96. Id. at 1050-55.




101. Id. at 1055.
102. Id.
103. 260 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001).
104. Id. at 678.
105. Id. at 674.
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language to "marginalize minorities and other oppressed groups."""(
The lecture included identification and analysis of certain words
"that have historically served the interests of the dominant culture
in which they arise."' Hardy's students identified certain offensive
words, and most of the class participated in the exercise, finding the
discussion to be challenging." However, one student objected to
the in-class use of certain words and complained to the college
administration."") Subsequently, the college informed Hardy that
there were no classes available for him to teach.""
The court held that Hardy's lecture, "which explored the
social and political impact of certain words," addressed a matter of
public concern."' Although Hardy's classroom speech itself did not
"constitute pure public debate," the words did "relate to matters of
overwhelming public concern - race, gender, and power conflicts in
our society. ' 12 Because Hardy's classroom speech addressed a
matter of public concern, the court conducted the Pickering-
Connick balancing test and held that Hardy's interest in free speech
outweighed the college's interest in limiting that speech. "'
C. Miles v. Denver Public Schools
In Miles v. Denver Public Schools,"4 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that Hazelwood was the proper standard to
determine the First Amendment protection of a high school
106. Id.
107. Id. at 674-75.
108. Id. at 675. The words identified in class by students were: "lady."
"girl." "bitch," "nigger," and "faggot." Id.
109. Id. An African-American female student complained to the
administration about Hardy's use of the words "bitch" and "nigger" in class.
Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 679.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 682. While conducting the balancing test, the court noted that
only one student objected to the discussion of the offensive words, and Hardy
finished the semester without any conflict. In addition, there was no evidence
that his lecture impeded Hardy's working relationship with his co-workers or
his performance of his duties in the classroom. ld. at 681.
114. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
teacher's classroom speech.' 5 In Miles, John Miles, a ninth-grade
government teacher, told his class that the quality of the school had
been declining since 1967 . His students probed him for specific
examples and he responded, "I don't think in 1967 you would have
seen two students making out on the tennis court." '' His statement
referred to a rumor that two students were observed having sex on
the tennis court during lunch the previous day."' Students' parents
complained and the principal placed Miles on paid administrative
leave for four days." '  Subsequently, the principal issued a
reprimand letter and placed it in Miles's file.' 2
In applying Hazelwood, the court noted that "[a] school's
interests in regulating classroom speech ... are implicated
regardless of whether that speech comes from a teacher or
student.""' In the first step of the Hazelwood analysis, the court
found that Miles's classroom was a nonpublic forum because there
was no evidence that the school intended to open up his classroom
1.15. Jd. at 775. Notably. the Tenth Circuit considered but expressly
rejected the application of the Pickering-Connick standard in this case. The
court stated:
Although the Pickering test accounts for the state's
interests as an employer, it does not address the
significant interests of the state as an educator....
Hazelwood recognized that a state's regulation of
speech in a public school setting is often justified by
peculiar responsibilities the state bears in providing
educational services. . . [which] warrant application of
the standard adopted in Hazelwood for reviewing
regulation of classroom speech rather than the
Pickering standard.
Id. at 777.




120. id. at 774-75. In the reprimand letter, the principal told Miles that
his comment about the students engaging in affectionate behavior on the
tennis court was "an inappropriate topic for comment in a classroom setting"
and instructed Miles to refrain from commenting on "any items which might
reflect negatively on individual members of [the] student body." It.
121. Id. at 777.
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for public discourse.' The court also found that his statement to
his government class bore the imprimatur of the school.3 ' In the
next step of the analysis, the court determined the school's
restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.1 24 Therefore, the school's restrictions on Miles's speech
were constitutional.
125
D. Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District
In Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District, the
Tenth Circuit also applied the Hazelwood holding to govern the
regulation of a college professor's classroom speech. 27  In
Vanderhurst, Professor Stuart Vanderhurst taught classes at
Colorado Mountain College, and some of his students complained
that he made inappropriate and offensive comments during class.' 2S
122. Id. at 776.
123. Id. at 776 (referring to Hazelwood). The court stated: "We are
convinced that if students' expression in a school newspaper bears the
imprimatur of the school, then a teacher's expression in the 'traditional
classroom setting' also bears the imprimatur of the school." Id. (quoting
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. 484 U.S. 260. 271 (1988)).
124. i. at 778-79. The school's legitimate pedagogical interests included
interests in "preventing Miles from using his position of authority to confirm
an unsubstantiated rumor[,] ... ensuring that teacher employees exhibit
professionalism and sound judgment[,] ... [and] providing an educational
atmosphere where teachers do not make statements about students that
embarrass those students among their peers." Id. at 778.
125. Id.
126. 208 F.3d 908 (10th Cir. 2000).
127. Id. at 914-15. In Vanderhurst, the court applied Hazelwood to
professor classroom speech without actually holding that Hazelvood is the
proper analytical framework. The court did not need to decide this issue
because the holding of the case is based on the fact that the appellant did not
properly preserve the issue for appellate review. Id. However, the court's
ltazelwood analysis is illustrative of how a court would apply Hazelwood to a
professor's classroom speech.
128. Id. at 910-11. The specific allegations against Vanderhurst were:
[Hie discussed the presence of tampons in a sewer
plant while lecturing about animal parasites: he
referred to human anal and oral sex and male orgasms
during a lecture about the transmission of parasites; he
used the terms "big dog." "big chair," and "floaters
The college suspended Vanderhurst without pay and later
dismissed him. 2' In its Hazelwood analysis, the court found that the
classroom was a nonpublic forum and that Vanderhurst's in-class
speech was curricular and could be perceived as school-sponsored
speech. U° The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that Vanderhurst's termination was reasonably related to specific
legitimate pedagogical concerns, interests embedded in the school's
code of ethics and sexual harassment policy.""'  Thus, his
termination was constitutional and his speech unprotected."12
Notably, the Sixth Circuit in Cockrel and Hardy, and the
Tenth Circuit in Miles and Vanderhurst, applied the same speech
standards to teachers' classroom speech at the secondary and
postsecondary levels. The Sixth Circuit applied the Pickering-
Connick standard to determine the First Amendment protection of
a fifth-grade teacher's and college instructor's classroom speech, '
and the Tenth Circuit applied the Hazelwood standard to
determine the protection of a high school teacher's and college
professor's in-class speech.134  Given the lack of Supreme Court
precedent regarding the free speech rights of teachers, lower courts'
similarity in treatment of student speech at the secondary and
postsecondary levels,"' and the circuits' similarity in treatment of
and sinkers" to describe feces; he made comments
insulting to blondes; he called a female student "rose
bud"; he degraded a student by discussing an incident
in which she was bitten by a pig; he intimated that




1130. Id. at 914-15.
131. Id. at 915.
132. Id. at 918.
133. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050-55 (6th
Cir. 2001): Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll. 260 F.3d 671, 678 (6th Cir. 2001).
134. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991);
Vanderhurst, 208 F.3d at 914-15. Although the Vanderhurst court did not hold
Hazelwood applicable to professor classroom speech, the court's ttazelwood
analysis is illustrative of how a court would apply the standard to teacher
classroom speech at the university level. Jd.
135. See supra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
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teachers' classroom speech at the secondary and postsecondary
levels, courts will likely follow the example of the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits and apply the same standard to all teacher speech, at both
the secondary and postsecondary levels.
E. Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education
In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,'3' the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Pickering-Connick
"public concern" threshold test 7 and the Hazelwood "legitimate
pedagogical concern" test 11s to determine the First Amendment
protection of teacher in-class speech. Margaret Boring, a high
school drama teacher, chose the play Independence for her students
to perform in an annual competition. Independence was about a
divorced mother and her three daughters." ' One daughter was
unwed and pregnant and another was a lesbian.1° The principal
approved the play for the competition. After the annual
competition, parents expressed disapproval of the play's content,
and the school transferred Boring from the high school.1
42
The court applied the Pickering-Connick public concern test
as a threshold matter.i13 Using the public concern analysis, the
court held that Boring's speech, the selection of the play, was a
curricular decision made in Boring's role as an employee. 4
Therefore, her speech addressed an internal workplace matter, not145
a matter of public concern. As a result, the court found her
1136. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
1137. Id. at 368-69.
138. Id. at 369-70.
139. Id. at 366.
140. Id.
141. Id. The principal agreed to the performance of the play at the
annual competition, but with "certain portions deleted." Id. The court
assumed that the play was performed according to the principal's instructions.
Id.
142. Id. at 366-67. The principal requested and the superintendent
approved the transfer of Boring from the school, citing "personal conflicts
resulting from actions she initiated during the course of the year." Id.
143. Id. at 368-69.
144. Id. at 368.
145. Id.
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speech unprotected. ' In dicta, the court explained that if Boring's
speech had met the public concern threshold test, her speech would
have failed the second part of their test, the Hazelwood legitimate
pedagogical concern analysis. Under Hazelwood, the court noted
that her speech was curricular and curricular decisions are by
definition legitimate pedagogical concerns.4  Since Boring's
termination was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical
concern, her transfer was constitutional and her speech
unprotected. 141
III. COMPLEXITIES WITH THE EXISTING PRECEDENT AS APPLIED
TO TEACHER IN-CLASS SPEECH
A. Problems with the Pickering-Connick Standard
The public concern threshold test "fails to account
adequately for the unique character of a teacher's in-class speech"' '
and "ignores the essence of teaching - to educate, to enlighten, to
inspire - and the importance of free speech to this most critical
endeavor."' ' Distinct from the district attorney in Connick or the
hospital nurse in Waters, teachers are hired and paid to discuss a
variety of subjects in lectures. It is a teacher's job to present
numerous topics, and this professional requirement should not be
146. Id.
147. Id. at 370.
148. Id. The court stated:
There is no doubt at all that the selection of the
play... was a part of the curriculum .... The makeup
of the curriculum of [a school] is by definition a
legitimate pedagogical concern.... If the performance
of a play under the auspices of a school and which is a
part of the curriculum of the school, is not by definition




150. id. at 378 (Motz, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
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limited or determined by whether or not in-class speech addresses a
matter of public concern .
When courts conduct the public concern threshold test, they
consider the role of the speaker -  and the "content, form, and
context" of the speech in question.' 5 It is within a court's discretion
to choose which of these factors to focus on most heavily, which
causes further inconsistency in the application of this particular
152. See id. In her dissent. Judge Motz noted:
When a teacher steps into the classroom she assumes a
position of extraordinary public trust and confidence:
she is charged with educating our youth. Her speech is
neither ordinary employee workplace speech nor
common public debate. Any attempt to force it into
either of these categories ignores the essence of
teaching.
Id. Some commentators agree that the public concern test fails to account for
the unique role of teachers in the education process and is not the proper
standard to use when determining the First Amendment protection of a
teacher's in-class speech. See generally, Daly, supra note 11, at 10; Weiner,
supra note 7, at 627-31 (arguing that Pickering-Connick provides little
protection for teachers' classroom speech and "the mere invocation of the
Pickering test often means that the teacher will lose"); see also Clarick, supra
note 7, at 702. Clarick states:
Although Pickering [and] Connick... provide
substantial protection for some speech of teachers, [the
employee speech standard] provides an inappropriate
model for examination of teachers' in-class speech.
The distinction between speech related to issues of
public concern and speech internal to an employees'
[sic] workplace does not take into account the function
and unique atmosphere of teaching. Teachers' in-class
speech addressed to students is neither 'internal
workplace speech,' analogous to the inter-office
questionnaire at issue in Connick, nor explicitly a part
of the public debate, as was Pickering's letter.
Nonetheless, a teacher's in-class expression has
dramatic public repercussions because of its role in
educating students.
Id.
153. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
154. Id. at 147-48.
standard. ", To illustrate, the Cockrel court's public concern test
was content determinative. [5 The court found the content of
Cockrel's speech, the environmental benefits of using industrial
hemp, to be a political and social concern in the community.) 
7
Therefore, her speech passed the public concern threshold test and
received provisional protection.' ' In contrast, the Boring court's
public concern test was role determinative. 1 Because Boring was
speaking in her role as a teacher, she was not speaking as a citizen
"but instead as an employee upon matters of personal interest."
360
Thus, the court held her speech failed the public concern threshold
test and the school won."'
The Cockrel and Boring holdings illustrate the difficulties in
applying the public concern threshold test to a teacher's in-class
speech.' 6' On one hand, the Cockrel content-determinative
approach ignores the role of the speaker. Although lower courts
have traditionally limited what constitutes a matter of public
concern with regard to content, 163, the content-determinative
approach gives teachers too much discretion. For example, under
155. See generally Daly. supra note 11, at 9-10.








162. See generally Karin B. Hoppmann. Concern with Public Concern:
Toward a Better Defi'nition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 993. 101.2-19 (1997) (describing problems with the content-based
public concern threshold test for public employees in general).
163. See generally Ann Hassenpflug, Avoiding Violations of Faculty irst
Amendment Freedom of Speech Rights, 134 EDtuc. L. REP. 439, 443 (1999).
With regard to content: "Speech that addresses issues of quality of education
and safety for students, district use and misuse of public funds, a district's
implementation of mandated instructional programs, electoral politics, and
equity of personnel decisions and procedures is most likely to receive
protection." Id.
164. See generally R. Weston Donehower, Boring Lessons: Defining the
Limits of a Teacher's First Amendment Right to Speak Through the
Curriculum, 102 MICH. L. REv. 517, 533-35 (2003) (arguing that Cockrel's
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Cockrel's content-determinative approach, a teacher's in-class
speech would pass the public concern test and receive provisional
protection so long as the speech addressed a topic of community
concern. 6 On the other hand, the Boring public concern analysis is
solely role-determinative. 1 Under this approach, whenever a
teacher facilitates the curriculum by speaking in class, regardless of
the content of the speech, the teacher is always speaking as an
employee on a matter of private concern. Thus, the role-
determinative approach provides little, if any, protection of
teachers' classroom speech."'
Applying Cockrel and Boring to Dr. Tuttle's case"')
illustrates why the public concern test should be rejected as the test
for determining the First Amendment protection of teachers' in-
class speech. Under Cockrel's content-determinative test, a court
could reasonably conclude that philosophy, generally, and an
individual's personal philosophy, specifically, are not matters of
public concern. Matters of public concern are those matters over
which "free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making
by the electorate"'" or "matter[s] of political, social, or other
concern to the community.""' Philosophy does not qualify as such.
Thus, Dr. Tuttle's speech is not entitled to First Amendment
protection. Alternatively, under Boring's role -determinative public
concern test, since Dr. Tuttle's speech occurred during his lectures,
a court could reasonably conclude that he was speaking in his role
as an employee and that his speech was merely internal workplace
content-determinative public concern test grants more protection to teachers
because so long as the content of the speech addresses a matter of public
concern then the speech is given provisional First Amendment protection).
165. See id.
166. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 371.
167. See id. at 368. See generallv Donehower, supra note 164, at 528.
168. See generaly Weiner, supra note 7, at 630. Weiner argues that the
.,context in which the speech occurs tends to dominate the other factors that
define 'public concern."' Id. Thus, a "court may refuse to label the speech as
a matter of public concern when a teacher addresses her speech only to her
students [in her role as a teacher] and not to the community at large." Id.
169. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
170. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
171. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
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speech. If the court concluded that his case is "nothing more than
an ordinary employment dispute, ' his speech would not receive
First Amendment protection. Ultimately, the "public concern" test
ignores a teacher's role, which is to discuss certain subjects in the
school's curriculum regardless of whether they address matters of
public concern.
B. Difficulties with the Hazelwood Standard
Because teacher in-class speech could be viewed as bearing
the imprimatur of the school,' because a classroom is usually a
nonpublic forum,174 and because limitations on teacher speech may
172. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 369 (quoting Kirkland v. Northsidc Indep.
Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989)).
173. Hazclwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260. 271 (1988). See
generally Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir. 1991). The court in
Bishop stated:
While a student's expression can be more readily
identified as a thing independent of the school, a
teacher's speech can be taken as directly and
deliberately representative of the school. Hence.
where the in-class speech of a teacher is concerned, the
school has an interest ... in scrutinizing expressions
that "the public might reasonably perceive to bear [its]
imprimatur[.]"
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
174. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. See, e.g., Miles, 944 F.2d at 776 (finding
that a classroom was a nonpublic forum). Although courts conduct the public
forum analysis as part of the Hazelwood standard, some argue that there are
problems with the public forum analysis when determining the protection of
teachers' classroom speech. See generally Thomas Dienes. The Trashing of the
Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
109, 119-20 (1986) (criticizing the labels of "public" and "nonpublic" forums
when determining First Amendment protection of speech), Kevin G. Welner.
Locking up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking out School Reform: Court's
Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in America's Public Schools.
50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 959, 1020 (2003) (arguing that if the Court applies the
narrow focus of the public forum analysis with regard to classrooms, the
analysis would exclude the concerns about the open. robust marketplace of
ideas that the Court has recognized as important); Clarick, supra note 7, at
712. Clarick argues:
Hazelwood endangers the protection of teachers'
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promote the inculcation of community values, lower courts have
found it appropriate to apply the Hazelwood standard to teacher in-
class speech even though Hazelwood governs student speech. 75 In
addition, some lower courts hold that any curricular decisions or
curricular in-class speech is by definition a legitimate pedagogical
concern. Thus, so long as a school's speech restriction is
reasonably related to a teacher's curricular decisions or in-class
speech, the restrictions are constitutional and the speech is
unprotected.177
If a court were to apply Hazelwood to Dr. Tuttle's in-class
statements, the court reasonbly could conclude that Tuttle's
classroom, like the student newspaper in Hazelwood, is a nonpublic
forum because it has not been opened up to the public.'1 In
addition, the court could hold under Hazelwood that Tuttle's in-
class speech reasonably could be perceived as school-sponsored
since he was facilitating the school's curriculum through in-class
speech."" If the court held Dr. Tuttle's classroom is a nonpublic
forum and his in-class speech is school-sponsored, then under
Hazelwood, the school may restrict his speech so long as the
restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TEST PROPOSED
The following proposed test constitutes an alternative to the
rights to speak freely. Although the Hazelwood
opinion directly addressed students' rights, the
Supreme Court's primary reliance on public forum
analysis suggests the possibility that lower courts may
find that other "school-sponsored, curricular" speech,
particularly the in-class speech of employee teachers.
occurs in nonpublic forums.
Id.
175. See supra note 14 for examples of lower courts' application of
JHazelwood to teacher in-class speech.
176. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 370.
177. Id.
178. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
179. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 370.
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tests discussed above. Because lower courts have applied the same
standards to secondary and postsecondary student speech,"" they
are likely to apply the same standards to secondary school teachers
and university professors when determining the First Amendment
protection of their in-class speech. Furthermore, some courts,
including the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, in fact have applied the
same standard to teachers at both educational levels."' Thus, this
alternative test would apply to educators at both secondary and
postsecondary institutions. Under the proposed test, the school
must prove as a threshold matter that the teachers' classroom
speech caused an actual or potential substantial disruption2 in the
facilitation of the curriculum. To restrict speech based on a
potential disruption, the school's prediction of disruption must be
180. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1286 (10th Cir.
2004) (applying the Hazelwood standard to a university student's curricular
speech); see also Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 947-49 (7th Cir. 2003)
(applying a standard similar to Tinker to a student school newspaper), reh 'g en
bane granted, opinion vacated, No. 01-4155 (7th Cir. June 25, 2003): Brown v.
Li, 308 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Hazelwood standard to a
graduate student's curricular speech). But see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180 (1972) (staling, after noting the similarities between college campuses and
the general public, "the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view
that, because of the acknowledged need for order. First Amendment
protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large").
181. See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052
(6th Cir. 2001) (applying the Pickering-Coirnick standard to a fifth-grade
teacher's classroom speech); Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679
(6th Cir. 2001) (applying the Pickering-Connick standard to a college
instructor's in-class speech). See also Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll.
Dist., 208 F.3d 908. 914-15 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying Hazelwood to a college
professor's classroom speech): Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773. 778-79
(10th Cir. 1991) (applying the Hazelwood standard to a high school teacher's
in-class speech).
182. Cf Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661. 673 (1994) (explaining that the
government employer's interest in workplace efficiency is so substantial that
an employer may restrict employee speech based on an actual or potential
disruption in workplace efficiency); linker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969) (holding that a student speech restriction is
unconstitutional unless there is evidence that such a restriction on speech is
"necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline").
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reasonable. A court may consider the context and content of the
speech in its determination of this threshold matter." If the school
fails to prove that the speech at issue was a potential or actual
substantial disruption, the teacher wins and the speech restrictions
are unconstitutional.
If the school meets its burden by showing either that the
speech caused an actual disruption or that the school's prediction
of disruption was reasonable, the speech receives conditional First
Amendment protection, and the court should then balance the
involved interests."' The court will weigh the educator's interest in
teaching students skills necessary to participate in a democracy
through the designated curriculum" against the school's interest in
promoting societal values through the particular curriculum."" If
the school fails to show that its interest outweighs that of the
educator, then the educator wins, and the speech is protected.
However, if the school proves its interest is more substantial, the
school wins, the speech restrictions are constitutional, and the
speech is unprotected.
Under the proposed test, which rejects the Pickering-
Connick public concern threshold test, a court should determine
whether in-class speech caused an actual or potential substantial
disruption to the facilitation of the curriculum by considering
various contextual factors."' One important factor, for example, is
the student-teacher relationship, a unique and vital part of the
education system. In this relationship, teachers work to make
183. C. Connick v, Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). The Supreme
Court held that factors such as content, form, and context may be considered
in determining whether speech is a matter of "public concern." Id. Similarly.
in the proposed test. courts may consider these same factors to determine if
the speech caused an actual or potential disruption.
184. Cf Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that
courts must use a balancing test that weighs "the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees").
185. See generally stpra note 7.
186. See generally supra note 9.
187. Ci Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (holding that when conducting
matter of public concern test, courts must examine the content, form, and
context of the speech in question).
students feel comfortable expressing opinions and ideas in class in
order to develop critical thinking skills. At the same time, however,
teachers must maintain authority over students. Teachers'
classroom speech should be protected when they use their special
position of authority to open up the classroom to different ideas
and arguments for debate. However, teachers' speech should be
restricted when they use their authority to pressure students into
supporting a certain opinion or preventing students from expressing
their own ideas. If a teacher's classroom speech exerts this type of
pressure on a student and discourages the student from thinking
critically, the speech has obstructed the student's ability to learn the
skills necessary to participate in a democracy." '  Another
contextual factor a court may consider under the proposed test is
the content of the speech. ' The fact that a teacher has been hired
and paid to teach certain courses, devoting substantial amounts of
class time to matters wholly unrelated to the course, could
constitute a disruption in the curriculum.)"
In the proposed test, if the court determines that the
teacher's in-class speech caused an actual or potential substantial
disruption in the facilitation of the curriculum, then the court will
balance the respective interests. On one side of the balancing
equation, a teacher's interest in unrestricted classroom speech is not
an interest in speaking "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
188. See generally Clarick. supra note 7, at 733. Clarick argues that when
determining the First Amendment protection afforded a teacher's classroom
speech, a court should consider how a teacher presents the statement, and that
so long as "the teacher presents her statement as an argument -one of many -
its impact [on the education process] most likely is not disruptive." Id.
189. Factors are not limited to the student-teacher relationship. A court
might also consider the age and maturity level of students in the class, the
number of students affected by the teacher's classroom speech, and the
student's academic performance in that teacher's class.
190. Even the American Association of University Professors, which
advocates for a right to academic freedom that attaches to the individual
professor, believes that there should be at least some limitations on teachers'
classroom speech. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 8
("Teachers are entitled to full freedom in the classroom in discussing their
subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject.").
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public concern."'"' Instead, a teacher's interest is to create a robust
learning environment for students while implementing the school's
chosen curriculum.' 2 Many education scholars agree that the
primary societal goal of education in the United States is to teach
students how to think independently and critically, enabling them
to distinguish between competing arguments, a skill necessary to
effective participation in a democratic society."' In order for
students to learn how to discern truth and distinguish between
competing arguments, they must understand that multiple
viewpoints and ideas exist." Even the Supreme Court has
recognized that the learning process requires exposure to a
multiplicity of competing views. 115  Restrictions on teachers'
classroom speech cripple their ability to create the robust learning
environment necessary to further the interests of society and the
school."
191. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
192. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
193. See generallv Clarick, supra note 7, at 725 ("[C]ontemporary
educators ... criticize indoctrinative teaching methods, instead advocating
education that requires students to participate and think actively."): Education
for Democracy: A Statement Signed by Over 100 Distinguished Leaders, AM.
EDUCATOR, Fall 2003, at 6 (emphasizing the importance of the development
of critical thinking skills to actively participate in a democracy: "Our
purpose ... is to strengthen schools' resolve to consciously impart to students
the ideals and values on which our free society rests,"): David Fellman,
Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 3, 6 (1961) ("A
democratic society cannot function successfully without an enlightened public
opinion emanating from an educated citizenry."): Jonathan Marks, Book
Note, 86 MuH. L. REV. 1140, 1143 (1988) (reviewing AMY GUTMANN.
DEMOCRATIc EDUCATION (1987)) (noting that, in her book. Democratic
Education. Amy Gutmann argues that citizens can not participate fully in a
democracy if they have not learned how to deliberate critically): David M.
Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEx. L. REV. 951, 968
(1996) (emphasizing the importance of critical thinking and analytical skills as
essential qualities for democratic citizens).
194. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g.. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Wieman v. tUpdegraff.
344 U.S. 183, 197 (1952).
196. See generallv Clarick, supra note 7. at 725 ("[N]urturing thought in
students ... demands that teachers offer students choices between competing
arguments and an open-minded presentation of diverse viewpoints."); Betsy
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On the other side of the balancing equation is the school's
interest in facilitating a particular curriculum. Although a school
has a right to set the curriculum to inculcate community values, 7 it
does not have the right to set a "pall of orthodoxy." '  While a
school may have more control over value inculcation when
teachers' classroom speech is closely regulated, value inculcation is
only one aspect of the chosen curriculum. Fewer restrictions on
teachers' classroom speech enables teachers to more efficiently and
effectively implement the school's official curriculum in a way that
will expose students to different viewpoints instead of only
"officially approved ideas."' ) Thus, students learn critical thinking
skills not only from the substance of the official school-determined
curriculum itself, but also from a teacher's own choices regarding
how to facilitate the official curriculum."" This alternative
balancing test, unlike the Pickering-Connick or Hazelwood
standards, considers both the school's and the teacher's interests,
Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986). The
author analyzed the conflicting interests at stake in teacher free speech cases:
The dilemma is clear: Education necessarily involves
the process of selection, but it also requires some
degree of order within the institution to carry out the
educational mission.... Socialization to values through
a uniform educational experience necessarily conflicts
with freedom of choice and the diversity of a pluralistic
society.
Id.
197. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
198. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
199. See generally Clarick, supra note 7, at 730-31. The author argues:
By contributing their personal ideas and opinions,
teachers implement officially approved curricula
without limiting students' learning to officially
approved ideas. Thus, robust [Fjirst [A]mendment
protection for teachers - which encourages them to
voice diverse opinions and viewpoints without fear of
retribution - diminishes the dangers of a government
attempting to indoctrinate children with narrow-
minded dogma though classroom communication.
Id.
200. See generally id.
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which are unique to the education system.
2
01
If a court were to apply the proposed test to Dr. Tuttle's
situation and find that Tuttle presented his opinion as one of many
opinions and encouraged students to participate by commenting on
their own philosophies, then the court could reasonably conclude
that his speech was not a disruption. Tuttle would win, and the
school's restrictions on his speech would be unconstitutional. If, on
the other hand, the court were to find that Tuttle presented his
speech in a manner that pressured students to adopt his opinion,
then a court may reasonably conclude that Tuttle's speech caused a
disruption. His speech would receive conditional protection, and
the court would conduct the balancing test. If a court found Tuttle
had used substantial class time to comment on his personal
philosophy and students had not learned the particular curriculum,
then a court could find the school's interest weighed heavier. If the
school's interest is heavier, the school wins and Tuttle's speech is
unprotected. Conversely, a court could reasonably conclude that
Tuttle's interest was more substantial. In that case he would win,
and the school's restrictions on his speech would be
unconstitutional.
CON CLUS I ON
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that public schools have the right to set and inculcate
certain values through the curriculum. This right is promoted and
more tightly controlled when the schools can easily regulate
teachers' classroom speech . Nevertheless, the Court has also
recognized that teachers do not "'shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 2"3 In fact,
the Court has stated that teachers are the "priests of our
democracy" because "[i]t is the special task of teachers to foster
those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone
make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an
201. See generally Clarick, supra note 7 at 728-33.
202. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
203. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
enlightened and effective public opinion.-' In order for teachers
to carry out society's interest in education, they must be free to
create a learning environment that is free from indoctrination and
open to debate, discussion, and differing opinions. In this
environment, students will learn the critical and analytical skills
necessary to contribute to a democracy through the school's
specified curriculum. The alternative test proposed in this Note
considers those interests that are unique to the education system
more adequately than the existing public employee or student
speech standards.
Until the Supreme Court decides to take up this issue,
however, the inconsistencies and confusion in the circuit courts
regarding the level of First Amendment protection that should be
afforded to teachers' classroom speech will continue to produce
unpredictable results. With this sort of uncertainty and
unpredictability, educators will remain confused and uninformed
with respect to their First Amendment free speech rights in the
classroom.
204. Wiernan v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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